T he Chateau Montebello meeting on supportive care for persons with cancer -the Working Group reports of which meeting appear in this issue of the Journal-focussed attention on the many things we can do for people whose lives we can prolong, but whom we cannot cure. We can relieve symptoms, free people from pain, and we can, in many ways, help persons with cancer to carry their losses and their suffering with dignity and courage. The frustrating experience, as Harvey Schipper emphasizes in his prefatory letter, is that we are often unable to deliver what we know. The conference took up this theme and challenges us to consider the global scope of supportive care. Jan Stjernsward, and others, gently and persistently prodded conference participants to recognize, and to reflect upon the fact that cancer is a Third World problem too. The conference challenges us all to move beyond a local, neighbourhood, or even national ethic, to think and to act within an horizon of global solidarity with all human beings who suffer pain, loss, and deadly disease.
THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ARE

QUESTIONED
The conference raised two very contemporary and very difficult ethical questions. Both are addressed, though not exclusively, to the North, to those of us living in the developed rich countries of the world, to those of us living in the economic, societal and medical zones of privileged existence.
What is the magnitude and depth of our moral responsibility towards our needy and suffering fellow human beings across the planet; towards those, who, as compared to us, receive such an inequitable share of the world's basic sustaining goods <1nd services?
The second and related question asks about the possibility of a unified ethic for the whole of humanity. We faced this issue at Chateau Montebello when. we considered the ethical standards that should guide clinical investigators from developed countries when they are conducting clinical trials in countries of the developing world. Are ethical standards for research with human beings universal or are they culturally and societally relative? How does one find a path between ethical imperialism on the one side and ethical exploitation on the other? Should physicians in Africa, China, India, and Japan follow the same ethical standard as physicians in North America when it comes to telling patients the "truth" about cancer? The Chinese philosopher, Mo-ti, phrased the second question more sharply than any of us did at Montebello when he observed and asked: "Where standards differ there will be opposition. But how can the standards of the world be unified ?"'(5).
MORALLY INTOLERABLE INEQUITIES
Do the standards of the world have to be unified before we respond humanely to intolerable international inequities? If we focus attention on standards of care, we must ask what the principles of distributive justice demand when they are directed to the human community across the planet. The right to health care means at least a claim in justice to a fair share, and to a decent standard of health, medical, and hospital services. Everyone recognizes that this standard cannot be identical in all places, nor identical at all times in the same place. Historical and .geographical differences are part of the human condition. Yet, some disparities in the shares people enjoy within local communities, and within nations, are dearly recognizable as so unfair that the inequities are morally intolerable. .
Clearly, there are terrible international inequities marking the shares of food, hospital care, and medicines that people receive within the global community. But how do we perceive these inequities? How do we judge them? Simply as facts, tragic indeed; but still as facts deriving from presumably unchangeable behavioural laws, based on national interests, that govern the relationships between nations? Are we really capable of perceiving and judging these inequities as morally intolerable! As wrongs we must right? Are we capable of seeing these inequities as totally incompatible with the relationships we in the developed world should have to people in developing countries?
HUMANITY: THE MEASURE OF AN ETHICS FOR CANCER?
The 1980 report of the North-South commission, chaired by W. Brandt, former Chancellor of West Germany, repeatedly stresses its cardinal premise that the survival of mankind is a global challenge, an imperative powerful enough to create a bond of global solidarity (4). But we have not yet grown up into a mature consciousness of global community, and we remain wishy-washy, indeed even doubtful, about the extent of our moral imperative to work mightily for the survival of others and for assuring them standards of sustenance that are essential for human dignity. Indeed, it is far from clear to us "that everyone in the world has a claim in everyone else, simply because we are all human being, or that rich nations have an obligation to share their wealth and technology. One has obligations to provide for the well-being of one's own children, for example, but not necessarily for the children of others'! (2).
If humanity is the imperative measure of an ethics for cancer, AIDS, and hunger, then our Northern ethic, to paraphrase Hans Jonas, is sadly unprepared for its planetary challenge. An ethic is dependent upon an ethos, an image or vision of what ."being human" means, and as well of the society and community towards which human beings should aspire. But what sense of community do we have now? I am not asking about the idealistic, philanthropic, or even utopian ideas about world community that some people may hold personally dear, and even proclaim publicly on solemn occasions. I direct attention rather to the operative image of a human being, and the operative idea of human society, that currently determine the way power is shared, the way money and capital are amassed, and the way goods and services are distributed within the affluent nations of the North, and between these nations and countries struggling for development.
IS OUR SOCIETY READY FOR A GLOBAL ETHIC?
Our liberal democratic societies of the developed world, if the late C.B. Macpherson's analysis is correct, harbour an inherent contradiction between two freedoms. Liberal" can mean freedom of the stronger to do down the weaker by following market rules; or it can mean equal effective freedom of all to use and develop their capacities. The latter freedom is inconsistent with the former" (3). Capitalistic market freedom supersedes, when it does not outrightly contradict, the effective freedom of all for selfdevelopment.
Democracy, within the equilibrium or pluralist elitist model of liberal democracy prevailing in affluent Western societies since the middle of this century, has been judged, in the Macpherson analysis, of being little more than a market mechanism for registering the desires of people as they are, or as they are seen to be by power elites within the dominant oligopolistic economic market. Democracy has failed to be a transforming principle advancing people towards what they might be or might wish to be. The ethos of equilibrium democracy perpetuates the image of human beings as consumers, as maximizers of their own satisfactions, and of the benefits and utilities that flow to them from society. Society in this ethos is little more than a collection of individuals constantly seeking power and possession over and at the expense of each other (3). If R.
Descartes grounded human existence in the power of thought, "Cogito, ergo sum," this prevailing ethos grounds human existence in the power of possession, "Habeo, ergo sum" (6) .
It is unlikely that international inequities, even terribly tragic inequities, will be seen as morally intolerable when perceptions, judgments, and policies are shaped by an ethos that presents human beings as maximizers of their own consumer interests in a society that requires an equilibrium of inequality. A global ethic for cancer, AIDS, and hunger will require an epochal change in consciousness, a change that will lead to a preference for community over affluence (3). but a new consciousness, as Jean Cebser has explained, cannot arise within human beings only on the force of interpretations and sermons (1) . The consciousness of human global solidarity, with its implication that human beings do have a claim on us just because they are human, needs to be realized in particular concrete endeavours before it expands to become the ethos and the foundation for a new global ethics.
We do not have to wait, and we do not have time to wait, for the unification of world standards before mobilizing our efforts to reverse intolerable international inequities. Quite the contrary. We demonstrate that global ethic already when, for example, we mount an effective international campaign to free cancer patients from pain throughout the world. We also demonstrate in that act the germ of a new world community within which inequities regarding the basics for human life and dignity are seen and deemed to be utterly intolerable.
